Avoiding Misunderstandings of Meditative Equipoise in the Nature of Reality (Dharmatā-Samādhi)
Editor’s Note: Within the framework of Tibetan Buddhism, “meditative equipoise in the nature of reality” (dharmatā-samādhi) is a pivotal concept. As described in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (Ornament of Clear Realization), one of the descriptions of a first-ground Bodhisattva’s meditative equipoise in dharmatā can be summarized as follows: at the Path of Seeing (darśanamārga), one directly realizes, through non-conceptual wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna), the nature of reality (dharmatā) that is free from the dualistic grasping.
However, do not assume that realizing emptiness (śūnyatā) requires the disappearance of all phenomena. If you think that upon entering dharmatā-samādhi all appearances are bound to vanish, then allowing you to seize hold of some “thing” completely distinct from phenomena, that is a misunderstanding of dharmatā-samādhi. It is not like that at all.
“Dharmatā-samādhi” is a great articulation emerged after the Buddhadharma spread to Tibet, especially systematized by the great master Longchenpa (Longchen Rabjam). Earlier Indian Buddhism did not explicitly use this exact term. It resolved a major “controversial issue” regarding the Second Turning of the Dharma Wheel: since “form is emptiness,” then form and emptiness are fundamentally identical. By this logic, since we have already perceive form—for example, a cup—should we not have already perceived “emptiness” and thus attained the status of a noble bing? The logic seems airtight—if form and emptiness are completely inseparable, where essence and appearance perfectly unified, then the mere perception of form ought to constitute the realization of emptiness.
Longchenpa resolved this issue through the articulation of dharmatā-samādhi. He clarified that the “form” perceived within dharmatā-samādhi is not the mundane appearance experienced by ordinary beings (pṛthagjana). Rather, it is the very essence of that appearance—what he called dharmatā-form.
He demonstrated that what is realized within dharmatā-samādhi can never be separated from appearance. If it were separated, this would amount to dividing the Two Truths (satya-dvaya), which would lead to the three major faults that the Prāsaṅgika school attributes to the Svātantrika school. (Editor’s note: These three refutations are: 1) that the noble one’s fundamental meditative equipoise in Dharmatā would become a cause for obliterating phenomena; 2) that conventional truth should withstand ultimate analysis; 3) that even from an ultimate standpoint, the arising of phenomena cannot be negated. See the Madhyamakāvatāra.)
We aspire to realize emptiness; and to realize emptiness means liberation (mokṣa). When we genuinely sense that phenomena are not truly existent, we have already tasted a hint of liberation. Yet to feel that external appearances are utterly devoid of inherent existence—to feel it in the most vivid and direct way—that is dharmatā-samādhi. For “phenomena are not truly existent” carries two meanings: first, phenomena are absolutely ever-changing; second, phenomena can disappear.
Regarding the state of realizing emptiness and whether appearances must disappear, the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka hold different views. In particular, the Lower Svātantrika asserts that appearances are changing, dreamlike and illusory—without true substance—yet they do not vanish. All appearances are like dreams, illusions, bubbles, and shadows. This is the Lower Svātantrika understanding of the realization of emptiness (śūnyatā).
However, the Upper Svātantrika maintains that after realizing emptiness, external objects disappear. Once they disappear, what remains? A kind of “non-existence”is left—they effectively establish a position leaning toward the extreme of “non-being” (abhāva).
Many people, when trying to understand dharmatā-samādhi, often mistake it for “nothingness.” Since ordinary appearances seem to be absent, it feels as though nothing at all remains. Although we know that at that point it is beyond verbal expression and devoid of any assertions, because we have not personally experienced it, we inevitably try to conceptualize it. And once we use conceptual thought to speculate about that state of absolute non-assertion, where any assertion is inherently flawed”, it will inevitably be imagined as some kind of “nothingness.”
Therefore, what we imagine as “free from the four extremes” (catuṣkoṭi-vinirmukta) is, to a large extent, still a subtle form of “non-being,” because we have not experienced luminosity (prabhāsvaratā).
Those who have not studied Madhyamaka may find these points difficult to understand. But those who have studied Madhyamaka for many years should be able to grasp this—otherwise, it suggests the texts have not yet been thoroughly digested.
As just explained, the two Svātantrika positions differ in their interpretations of emptiness. The Prāsaṅgika view, however, is different from both. According to Prāsaṅgika, after realizing emptiness, it is neither “non-being” nor “being.” Then what is it? Form is emptiness (rūpaṃ śūnyatā), without dividing the Two Truths (satya-dvaya)! At that time, the external objects cognized are no longer like what we now perceive. External appearances are precisely the true nature of reality (dharmatā)—they are exactly what is realized. This perfectly embodies “form is emptiness.”
Therefore, the great master Longchenpa told us that dharmatā-samādhi is beyond verbal expression. To call it “non-being” is incorrect; to call it “being” is also incorrect. That is why, in ancient times, Chan master Dahui Zonggao would hold up a bamboo stick and challenge practitioners: “Tell me, is it existent or non-existent?” If they answered “existent,” they would be struck. If they answered “non-existent,” they would also be struck. For what he was pointing to was precisely the realization within dharmatā-samādhi—beyond being and non-being. It is the nature of reality itself (dharmatā).
——Excerpted and adapted from An Overview of Madhyamaka
This article is a preliminary translation draft and has not yet been reviewed or proofread by the speaker.
